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H U M A N  R I G H T S  &  H U M A N  W E L F A R E
Law, Human Rights, Realism and the 
“War on Terror” 
By J. Peter Pham 
The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror by 
Michael Ignatieff. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 
212 pp.  
The riveting images of the Iraqi prisoners being forced by United States military personnel into 
simulated sexual poses or otherwise abused at Baghdad’s notorious Abu Ghraib prison have become 
one of the most enduring, ironic, and, some might add, iconic images of the America’s “war on 
terror.” However, even before the emergence of the photographs thrust the issue to the forefront of 
political discourse, a public debate was long overdue on the balance to be struck between the 
competing demands of civil liberties and national security and whether or not violent responses to 
violence render both sides morally indistinguishable. It is not that a few farsighted individuals on 
both sides of the political divide did not attempt to have a principled discussion over the post-9/11 
flurry of executive decisions and legislative enactments—one thinks of concerns about the Patriot 
Act raised by figures as disparate as former House Majority Leader Dick Armey and American Civil 
Liberties Union executive director Anthony Romero. Nor is it the case that there have not been 
reports about some of the harsh interrogation techniques employed against captured terrorists—
witness Mark Bowden’s cover story in the October 2003 issue of the Atlantic Monthly with its 
copious excerpts from an apposite Central Intelligence Agency manual. Nevertheless, by and large, 
public discourse has been hijacked by absolutist claims and generally consists of often partisan, 
almost always shrill, moral posturing. Consequently, it may be a small blessing—although poor 
consolation to the victims of the abuse—that the now-infamous photographs from Abu Ghraib 
have finally forced the American body politic to confront the question of the relationship between 
law, human rights, and the realities of the Bush administration’s global fight against terrorism. And it 
is even more fortuitous that the prisoner abuse revelations coincided with the publication of 
journalist and historian Michael Ignatieff’s timely The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of 
Terror, a timely account of the challenges facing liberal democracies as they confront the 
phenomenon of international terrorism. 
Searching for a Balance 
When Ignatieff, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University, was 
invited to deliver the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh in 2002-2003—becoming only 
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the seventh American scholar so honored in the 115 year history of the prestigious series1—he 
opted for a presentation of applied ethics, rather than engaging in the speculative exercises that 
characterized the contributions of most of his predecessors. Ignatieff’s lectures, now gathered 
together in The Lesser Evil, address some of the very questions raised by the American-led “war on 
terrorism:” Must terrorism be fought with terror, assassination with assassination, torture with 
torture? Must civil liberties be sacrificed to protect public safety? In the book’s opening lines, its 
author acknowledges the challenge before him: 
When democracies fight terrorism, they are defending the proposition that their political life should be free of 
violence. But defeating terror requires violence. It may also require coercion, deception, secrecy, and violation of 
rights. How can democracies resort to these means without destroying the values for which they stand (vii)? 
The task that Ignatieff has set before himself is by no means facile. While many human rights and 
civil liberties groups have been outspoken in their condemnation of human rights violations 
committed in the post-9/11 war on terror, many—if not most—rights advocates have failed to fully 
face up to the reality of terrorism. No less a figure in the rights community than William Schulz, 
executive director of Amnesty International U.S.A., has acknowledged: 
The human rights community has repeatedly pointed out that it is difficult to conduct a war in defense of the 
rule of law when you are shredding that rule yourself….But what about the protection of personal security? 
How well have we done in holding the feet of terrorists and their supporters to the fire for their human rights 
violations? In this respect, the record of human rights organizations is far more mixed (Schulz 2004: 20). 
While not disagreeing with critiques of the defensive measures taken by liberal democracies, 
especially the United States, since September 11, 2001, Ignatieff adopts a realist stance when he 
faults many critics for dogmatically refusing to countenance that some liberties may have to be 
traded for security. Here, it would have been helpful if the author had entered into a discussion of 
what constitutes “security,” especially given the import of the concept for this discourse. Personal 
security—understood as an individual’s freedom from threat, danger, or harm coming from other 
people—could be said to be a fundamental good, an essential condition sine qua non of successful 
and fulfilling human existence. As Thomas Hobbes pointed out, the raison d’être of the sovereign 
state was as a security arrangement. Thus national security is similar to personal security, albeit 
applicable to the populations of nation-states rather than just individuals and, consequently, 
representing a common political as well as a personal good. Thus the point of a security policy is to 
deter threats from others and, where deterrence fails, to thwart them. However, Ignatieff is careful 
to enjoin that “government for the people…is something more than government for the happiness 
and security of the greatest number” since “the essential constraint of democratic government is that 
it must serve majority interests without sacrificing the freedom and dignity of individuals who 
comprise the political community to begin with and who on occasion may oppose how it is 
governed” (5). Consequently he comes down against both democrats who believe that “rights are 
prudential limits on government action, revocable in times of danger” as well as civil libertarians for 
1 The other Americans to serve as Gifford Lecturers at Edinburgh (and their published lectures) were William James 
(1900-1902, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study of Human Nature), John Dewey (1928-1929, A Quest for Certainty: A 
Study of the Religion of Knowledge and Action), Reinhold Niebuhr (1938-1940, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian 
Interpretation), Stanley Jaki (1974-1976, The Road of Science and the Ways to God), Martha Nussbaum (1992-1993, “Need and 
Recognition: The Emotions”), and David Tracy (1999-2000, “This Side of God”).  
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whom they are “foundational commitments to individual dignity that ought to limit government 
action in times of safety and danger alike” (6). Ignatieff favors what he construes to be the via media 
between the two opposing positions, one that ought to be debated in the open: 
Necessity may require us to take actions in the defense of democracy which will stray from democracy’s own 
foundational commitments to dignity. While we cannot avoid this, the best way to minimize harms is to 
maintain a clear distinction in our minds between what necessity can justify and what the morality of dignity 
can justify, and never allow the justifications of necessity—risk, threat, imminent danger—to dissolve the 
morally problematic character of necessary measures. Because the measures are morally problematic, they must 
be strictly targeted, applied to the smallest possible number of people, used as a last resort, and kept under the 
adversarial scrutiny of an open democratic system (8). 
This “lesser evil” ethic holds that neither the moralists nor the consequentialists ought to be 
allowed exclusive run of the polity’s decision making process. There will be times when what works 
is not right and what is right will not work. As its name implies, the “lesser evil” approach agrees 
with the moralists that some actions are always wrong, even if they are effective. However, with the 
consequentialists, it maintains that there are circumstances in which consequences matter so 
much—say, for example, saving the lives of innocent people from a terrorist attack—that necessity 
may require that a liberal democracy’s principle of self-defense compels it to take a course of action 
that strays from its own foundational commitments. In such an emergency, the body politic may opt 
for a morally problematic measure—doing so as a last resort and keeping it under the close scrutiny. 
On the face of it, the proposition appears reasonable, especially as the objective evidence of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 commission) and 
other post-9/11 investigations suggested. They concluded that the well-meaning “firewall” between 
the American government’s intelligence and law enforcement organs, as well as the post-Vietnam 
War restraints on the activities of intelligence agencies, had catastrophic consequences: the failure to 
communicate available foreign intelligence to relevant domestic security agencies and the 
misjudgment made by the U.S. regarding Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. However, 
if the war on terror requires lesser evils, what will keep them from sliding inexorably into the greater 
evil? 
Ignatieff argues that the institutions of liberal democracy are designed to handle such moral 
hazards, “The ultimate safety in a democracy is that decisions filtered down through this long 
process stand less a chance of being wrong than ones decided, once and for all, at the top” (11). 
Adversarial review—not only between the branches of government but within each—as well as a 
free press and other institutions of civil society can restrain the pernicious effects of the moral evils 
accepted in the war on terror. If the war waged against terrorism since September 11 has been a 
strain, it is so insofar as much of it has been waged in the shadows with little guidance from law and 
ethics. 
Where the exercise of power in the shadows has been subject to adversarial review in the open, the 
anecdotal evidence has been encouraging thus far. The Israeli Supreme Court, for example, has 
shown remarkable independence from the majority preferences of the Israeli electorate, not only 
with regard to aggressive interrogation techniques, but by recently ordering a change in the planned 
route of the security barrier being constructed along the border with the West Bank. The Israeli 
Court ruled that the army command had a duty to balance properly between security considerations 
and humanitarian ones. The U.S. Supreme Court, while acknowledging executive authority to detain 
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individuals as enemy combatants, has ruled that those held nonetheless have a right to a legal 
hearing where they may challenge the designation that is the basis for their detentions. After the 
initial deference to the president following the terrorist attacks of 2001, the U.S. Congress has held 
spirited, even bitterly partisan, debates. The 9/11 commission hearings have been rancorous at 
times. The American press has certainly not been silent; among the examples that could be cited: the 
handover of terrorist suspects to foreign governments for possible torture was uncovered by Barton 
Gellman and Dana Priest of the Washington Post; the techniques used in interrogation, including the 
CIA’s so-called Kubark Manual were exposed by Mark Bowden in the Atlantic Monthly; and the abuses 
at Abu Ghraib were brought to the world’s attention by Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker. Various 
human rights and civil liberties groups, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and 
the American Civil Liberties Union, have been unsparing in their criticism of perceived abuses. Even 
within the executive branch, there have been vigorous discussions: it was a report of the U.S. 
Department of Justice Inspector General, after all, that forced changes with procedures regarding 
administrative detainees. 
Even if the inherently adversarial political process has worked well enough to date, is a free 
society willing to risk everything on the faith that praeterita futura praedicat will always hold true? And 
even if it does, the lesser evil principle offers little guidance to ethical discernment with some of the 
most vexing issues, including the indefinite detention of unlawful combatants, torture, and targeted 
killing. Ignatieff argues that “foundational commitments” to human dignity would place indefinite 
detentions, torture, and extrajudicial executions beyond the pale, citing the “moral check” of 
international standards, including internationally ratified human rights instruments (23). Ironically 
enough, however, for a book whose subtitle appeals to “ethics,” the author advances an argument 
that seems far more positivist than it is ethical: there is no answer to the question of “Why?” other 
than an appeal to “standards.” In a war on opponents as cunning and elusive as terrorists, public 
opinion shifts and political conventions may be subject to change. There is no reason why the 
adversarial process cannot be likewise at work here, lowering as well as raising the barriers of what is 
permissible.2 There are no easy answers, and in his volume Ignatieff wisely does not proffer anything 
beyond proposing four general tests for policy makers to examine in the adversarial process: Do the 
coercive measures violate individual dignity? Do they unnecessarily depart from existing due process 
standards? Will they make citizens more secure in the long run? Have less coercive measures been 
tried? 
2 An example was Human Rights Watch executive director Kenneth Roth’s December 26, 2002, letter to President 
George W. Bush on the al-Qaeda detainees at Guantánamo, at www.hrw.org/press/2002/12/us1227.htm. Roth warned 
that the treatment of the prisoners would place the U.S. in violation of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions. The U.S. is a not a signatory to the protocol, its non-ratification absolving the U.S. from being legally 
bound by it under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Roth’s deft attempt to declare it “recognized as 
restating customary international law” notwithstanding. President Ronald Reagan’s January 29, 1987, letter of transmittal 
of Protocol II for Senate’s ratification explicitly stated that the reason was that it “would grant [lawful] combatant status 
to irregular forces even if they do not satisfy the traditional requirements to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population and otherwise comply with the laws of war. This would endanger civilians among whom terrorists and other 
irregulars attempt to conceal themselves” (Reagan 1987: 911). In the current circumstances, the ratification of Protocol I 
is even less likely, given considerations of electoral politics. 
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The Rights and Wrongs of Lawful and Unlawful Combatants 
If, as is often said, the first casualty in war is the truth, then the second is the law. While, in the 
present conflict, it might be an exaggeration to declare that silent leges inter arma, the law has certainly 
been used as an instrument by all sides in the debate, its clarity becoming obfuscated in the process. 
Nevertheless, as Hedley Bull once asserted, “war is unimaginable apart from the rules by which 
human beings recognize which behavior is appropriate to it and define their attitudes toward it” 
(Bull 1979: 595). Consequently, it would be useful to clarify what international law and U.S. law 
actually say about rights and obligations before returning to a discussion of the balance these 
competing claims. 
At least part of the recent confusion is attributable to the now-widespread use of the term 
“humanitarian law” for what used to be known as the ius in bello (generally rendered in English as the 
“laws of war”)—the former term being easily confounded with that of “human rights law.” While 
the realities to which humanitarian law and human rights law refer are related, they have different 
historical origins and are supported by distinct philosophies. The philosophical basis of human 
rights is that by virtue of an individual’s belonging to the human race, he or she possesses rights that, 
at a certain core level, are always applicable. In contrast to the universal object of the human rights 
law, humanitarian law has a more limited scope: to “civilize” warfare according to the basic 
principles of military necessity, humanity, and chivalry, as understood by the signers of the first 
Geneva Convention (1864) and its revision (1906), and the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907)—
the body of law out of which arose the modern-day Geneva Conventions (1949) and the Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (1977). The earlier codifications were based on two 
assumptions: that recourse to force was a legitimate instrument of policy for nation-states (ius ad 
bellum) and that during honorable conflict modern professional armies were expected to exercise 
restraint (ius in bello). Thus conventional war between states is tempered by what Ignatieff, in an 
earlier work, described as “codes of a warrior’s honor” (Ignatieff 1997: 116). These served to 
channel the violence, protecting civilian bystanders from attack and keeping the use of force 
proportional and limited to military necessity. These martial codes—which varied from culture to 
culture and ranged from Western Christendom’s code of chivalry to the bushido of the Japanese 
samurai—seem to have existed in all cultures and shared many common features, including sharp 
distinctions between combatants and non-combatants, legitimate and illegitimate targets, honorable 
and dishonorable weapons and tactics, and civilized and barbarous treatment of prisoners. In short, 
they were ethical systems  
…primarily concerned with establishing the rules of combat and defining the system of moral etiquette by 
which warriors judged themselves to be worthy of mutual respect. Warrior’s honor implied an idea of war as a 
moral theatre in which one displayed one’s manly virtues in public. To fight with honor was to fight without 
fear, without hesitation, and, by implication, without duplicity. The codes acknowledged the moral paradox of 
combat: that those who fight each other bravely will be bound together in mutual respect; and that if they 
perish at each other’s hand, they will be brothers in death (Ignatieff 1997: 117). 
Hence the “Lieber Code,” promulgated during the American Civil War by President Abraham 
Lincoln as General Orders No. 100 of April 24, 1863, and formally entitled Instructions for the 
Government of Armies in the Field, which were used as the primary basis for the Hague Conventions 
that defined military necessity in terms of what was necessary to defeat the enemy without resulting 
in unnecessary cruelty. 
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Military necessity admits all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons whose 
destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the war; it allows for the capturing of every 
armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of peculiar danger to the captor; it 
allows for all destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or 
communication, and for all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy; for the appropriation of 
whatever an enemy’s country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the army, and for such 
deception as does not involve the breaking of good faith either positively pledged, regarding agreements entered 
into during the war, or supposed by the modern law of war to exist. Men who take up arms against one 
another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God 
(Article 15). 
Military necessity does not admit cruelty—that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for 
revenge, nor maiming or wounding except in fight, not torture to extort confessions. It does not admit the use 
of poison in any way, nor wanton destruction of a district (Article 16). 
In view of these considerations, the Lieber Code specifically prescribed the protection of 
civilians and the decent treatment of POWs: 
Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced, 
especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the 
hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the 
unarmed citizen is to b spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit 
(Article 22). 
A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him 
by the intentional infliction of any suffering or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, 
death, or any other barbarity (Article 56). 
Honorable men, when captured, will abstain from giving to the enemy information concerning their own army, 
and the modern law of war permits no longer the use of any violence against prisoners in order to extort the 
desired information (Article 80). 
Consequently, the balance between military necessity and humanity was achieved by the creation 
of humanitarian law. This balance was achieved in four ways. First, actions without military value 
were simply prohibited, for example, the type of looting common in post-medieval warfare. Second, 
some actions having military value were nevertheless prohibited due to overriding humanitarian 
considerations, such as the ban on the use of poison. Third, the rule of proportionality was 
implemented as the test when considering any given military action—“incidental” harm to civilians 
must not be excessive in relation to military objectives. Finally, military necessity and the realities on 
the ground may override humanitarian rules. This is recognized in Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949, which, while generally prohibiting occupying powers from destroying property, 
also provides an exception, “where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military 
operations.” 
This system, however, relied on an implicit moral contract—and, in modern times, an explicit 
juridical accord solemnized by treaty—between “honorable men” whom circumstances rendered 
enemies to play by the same rules. Both sides understood that without these restraints, war would 
turn into a simple slaughter. Hence, when combatants departed from the “way of the warrior,” they 
and their victims expected them to be punished. During the Vietnam War, when Lieutenant William 
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Calley “secured” the hamlet of My Lai in the Viet Cong-controlled Son My district, he was brought 
before a court martial, not decorated. In Iraq, it should be noted, the goings-on at Abu Ghraib were 
first exhaustively documented by an internal military investigation headed by Major General Antonio 
Taguba. 
The difficulty arises when the “warrior’s honor” meets a terrorist militancy that recognizes 
neither limits nor reciprocity. Since fighting began in Afghanistan, there has been no shortage of 
denunciations regarding the Bush administration’s denial of prisoner-of-war (POW) status to al-
Qaeda and other fighters captured in Afghanistan and held at the U.S. naval base in Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba. Some of this criticism has been particularly aimed at the decision to classify two 
American citizens, Yaser Esam Hamdi and Abdullah al-Muhajir, né José Padilla, presently held at the 
naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina, as “enemy combatants” (see Roth 2004). More recently, a 
secondary body of literature has emerged attempting to prove a causal link between the “unlawful 
combatant” designation of the al-Qaeda-linked detainees and the abuses in Iraq. While one would 
not draw the inference from the polemics, the question of who is or who is not a POW is a fairly 
settled matter of international law when understood in the context of humanitarian law’s attempt to 
balance the competing demands of military necessity and humanity. Legal scholars David Rivkin and 
Lee Casey have summarized the rules long accepted by “civilized states” as follows: (1) only 
sovereign states have the right to make war; (2) civilians cannot be deliberately attacked; (3) 
combatants can be attacked either en masse or individually; (4) quarter is to be granted when 
requested; (5) lawful combatants, when taken prisoner or otherwise incapacitated by wounds, are to 
be accorded the respect and privileges of prisoners of war (POWs); and (6) while all forms of force 
can be deployed in combat, certain weapons designed to cause unnecessary suffering are proscribed. 
(Rivkin and Casey 2003: 60) 
Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention prescribed specific protections to “lawful 
combatants,” that is, members of the armed forces of nations in conflict or members of militias and 
organized resistance movements of nations in conflict provided they are (1) part of an organized 
command structure; (2) wear fixed insignia recognizable at a distance; (3) carry their weapons 
openly, and; (4) conduct their operations in accordance with “the laws and customs of war.” Those 
prisoners who meet these criteria are entitled “in all circumstance to respect for their persons and 
their honor” as POWs (Article 14). The state of Iraq is a party to the Geneva conventions and the 
military personnel of the fallen Iraqi regime were entitled to POW status. Consequently, the abuses 
at Abu Ghraib were violations of international humanitarian law insofar as those subject to abuse 
were legitimate POWs. On this much the law is clear. 
The case of members of al-Qaeda and other terrorists is more complicated. The Islamist 
terrorists of al-Qaeda and other groups represent no nation-states that are signatories to the Geneva 
Conventions. By and large, they do not even belong to the “national liberation movements” that 
were accorded some recognition by the signatories of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. They wear no 
distinctive uniforms and generally do not carry weapons openly. They deliberately target civilians 
and, where possible, do so in ways that maximize, rather than minimize, injury. They behead and 
mutilate prisoners, rather than accord them honorable POW status. In short, their modus operandi 
represents the antithesis of the “way of the warrior,” even as they exploit the rules of their 
opponents in order to carry out their apocalyptic schemes. Consequently, it would seem that they are 
not the “honorable men” who qualify for the protected status of POWs because they do not satisfy 
 97
7
Pham: Law, Human Rights, Realism and the “War on Terror”
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2004
V O L U M E  4  – 2 0 0 4
any—much less all four—of the requirements of the Geneva Convention. While the U.S. Supreme 
Court recently ruled in two suits brought on behalf of some of the detainees at Guantánamo—Rasul 
v. Bush3 and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld4—that these prisoners have a right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus
and an independent review of their status, it did not question the law underlying their classification
as unlawful enemy combatants and the denial of POW status.5 The rationale behind the
lawful/unlawful combatant distinction is clear from the philosophy motivating the laws of conflict.6
If professional armed forces are to achieve military objectives with the minimum of incidental
damage to the protected status of civilians, they must be able to easily distinguish the enemy from a
bystander. The possibility of protected status as a POW in the event of capture is the incentive for
military personnel to play by these rules, without which it would be impossible to balance military
necessity and humanitarian imperatives.
But what of those who, being unlawful combatants, are denied POW status once they are 
captured? Might they be subjected to the indignities and aggressive interrogation tactics—amounting 
even to torture—that are expressly prohibited with regard to captured military personnel? Here, the 
general norms are relatively clear. The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted in 1984, barred torture, which it defined 
in its first article as 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act 
he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by 
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity. 
The very next article of the Convention explicitly rules out any exigent circumstances: “No 
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political 
instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” Furthermore, 
3 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
4 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
5 It should be noted that the Supreme Court rulings in Rasul and Hamdi were rather narrow in scope, leaving unanswered 
a number of significant questions. What would constitute sufficient review of the prisoners’ status? Would military 
commissions suffice or must the hearings be before federal courts? Can the unlawful combatants be tried by military 
tribunals? May American citizens be tried by military tribunals? What right do enemy combatants, U.S. nationals or 
otherwise, have to counsel? In short, the Court rejected the administration’s argument that fair procedures were not 
required, but declined to say what those fair procedures were. In the third case, Rumsfeld v. Padilla (124 S. Ct. 2711 
[2004]), the court refused to rule on the legality of the prisoner’s detention on the grounds that the habeas corpus petition 
should not have been filed in New York against the secretary of defense, but against the commander of the naval brig 
where he is being held in South Carolina. 
6 Even though it does not use the terminology of “lawful” and “unlawful” with respect to combatants, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, official custodian of the Geneva Conventions, defines “combatant” as to mean “lawful 
combatant” and exclude, implicitly, the “unlawful”: “In international law, members of the armed forces of a party to the 
conflict, except medical and religious personnel, are combatants, that is they are entitled to take a direct part in 
hostilities. It is prohibited to recruit into the armed forces persons under the age of fifteen years. Combatants are under 
the obligation to distinguish themselves from the civilian population in accordance with the international law of armed 
conflict, and to respect that law. If they fall into the hands of the enemy Power, they are entitled to prisoner-of-war 
status” (Verri 1992: 32). 
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all states-parties to the convention oblige themselves to “undertake to prevent in any territory under 
its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,” including those 
that might not be so severe as to “amount to torture as defined in article 1” (art. 16). The United 
States is a signatory of the Convention, which was ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1994, and 
implemented it with the adoption of Section 2340 of Title 18 of the United States Code. In fact, the 
American legislation actually adopts a more open definition than the UN Convention, defining it as 
“an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) 
upon another person within his custody or physical control” and omitting the international accord’s 
restriction of torture to acts motivated by a desire to obtain information, punish, or intimidate. 
Furthermore, U.S. law does not delineate distinctions based on where the torture takes place: a U.S. 
citizen accused of torture may be prosecuted in a domestic jurisdiction regardless of where the 
alleged offense took place as may any foreign nationals who come unto American soil.7 The 
controversy that erupted over the release of U.S. Department of Justice guidance documents for 
these laws—one memorandum concluded that “acts must be of an extreme nature to rise to the 
level of torture” (Bybee 2002: 1)—was occasioned in no small part by the fact that the 
memorandums ran counter to legislative intent (Engle 2003: 502-503).8 
An Exception? The Case of the Ticking Time Bomb 
If the norm of the law is clear,9 even with regard to unlawful combatants, its ethical application 
in some cases is perhaps more ambiguous. In a chapter entitled “Should the Ticking Time Bomb 
Terrorist Be Tortured?” in his provocative book Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, 
Responding to the Challenge, Harvard Law School professor Alan Dershowitz, a noted advocate of 
civil liberties, presents the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called twentieth hijacker who was 
arrested before 9/11, after flight instructors reported suspicious statements he made while taking 
flight lessons. On this case, Dershowitz notes: 
The government decided not to seek a warrant to search his computer. Now imagine they had, and that they 
discovered he was part of a plan to destroy large occupied buildings, but without any further details. They 
interrogated him, gave him immunity from prosecution, and offered him large cash rewards and a new 
7 The legislation is question, the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, is codified under Title 28 of the U.S. Code, 
Section 1350, note. 
8 Interestingly, on the subject of the treatment of prisoners and what amounts to torture, European legislation is much 
more permissive than the American. The European Convention on Human Rights of November 4, 1950 (available at 
www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html), distinguishes between “torture” and “inhuman or degrading treatment” (art. 3). In 
one case before the European Court of Human Rights, The Republic of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, the majority held that 
the difference between these two categories ensued from the intensity of the suffering. Torture was defined as the 
deliberate use of inhumane treatment that causes severe and cruel pain and suffering, while anything short of that was 
left to the determination of the parties involved. See 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1978).  
9 Not all jurists concur on the clarity of the law regarding torture, citing the U.S. Senate’s reservation limiting the 
acceptance of the UN Convention’s proscriptions against “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” to 
the understanding in the American constitutional jurisprudence of the “Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution.” Consequently, Alan Dershowitz, for example, asserts: “Decisions by U.S. courts have suggested 
that the Eighth Amendment may not prohibit the use of physical force to obtain information needed to save lives; so if 
the United States chose to employ non-lethal torture in such an extreme case it could arguably remain in technical 
compliance with its treaty obligation” (Dershowitz 2002: 136).  
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identity. He refused to talk. They then threatened him, tried to trick him, and employed every lawful 
technique available. He still refused. They even injected him with sodium pentothal and other truth serums, 
but to no avail. The attack now appeared to be imminent, but the FBI still had no idea what the target was 
or what means would be used to attack it. An FBI agent proposes the use of non-lethal torture—say, a 
sterilized needle inserted under the fingernails to produce unbearable pain without any threat to health or 
life…The simple cost-benefit analysis for employing such non-lethal torture seems overwhelming: it is surely 
better to inflict non-lethal pain on one guilty terrorist who is illegally withholding information needed to 
prevent an act of terrorism than to permit a large number of innocent victims to die. Pain is a lesser and more 
remediable harm than death; and the lives of a thousand innocent people should be valued more than the 
bodily integrity of one guilty person. (Dershowitz 2002: 143-144) 
In response to the near-hysterical tenor of the criticism with which his proposal was greeted by 
some exponents of both the political left and right, Dershowitz appealed to, among other 
authorities, Jeremy Bentham, who argued from his utilitarian perspective that happiness can be 
calculated and quantified and it is consequently acceptable to inflict pain and suffering on the few to 
serve the wants and needs of the many (see Dershowitz 2003: 275-276). Dershowitz went on to 
resolve the dilemma between the demands of public safety and security on the one hand and civil 
liberties and human rights on the other by appealing to a third value: accountability and visibility. He 
advocates revised legislation to accommodate torture in the “ticking bomb case” through the use of 
judicial “torture warrants” that would authorize the administration to employ a predetermined 
amount of non-lethal pressure. While these reassurances are hardly comforting to many civil 
libertarians and other human rights advocates, these critics would do well to consider the moral 
weakness of the current idealist system whereby everyone professes opposition to aggressive 
interrogation techniques while knowing full well that it is occurring, and, in many cases, tacitly 
approving of them. As Dershowitz asserts, “it seems logical that a formal, visible, accountable, and 
centralized system is somewhat easier to control than an ad hoc, off-the-books, and under the radar-
screen system” (Dershowitz 2002: 158). In fact, he argues that imposing a ban while knowingly 
avoiding evidence of torture’s occurrence only promotes disrespect for the rule of law in general and 
may even have the effect of increasing the instances of unjustifiable abuse in particular. 
Absent a new wave of attacks on the American homeland on the scale of 9/11—and then 
probably only if another Moussaoui is arrested—it is highly unlikely that Dershowitz’s controversial 
proposal will be enacted.. However, this does not mean that torture and the “moderate physical 
pressure” that some writers refer to as “coercion” or “torture lite” (Bowden 2003: 54) do not occur; 
it simply means that when these methods are employed, they are beyond the legal pale and, 
consequently, without restraint.  
To date, the only country in the world to publicly acknowledge the use of coercive techniques 
against suspected terrorists is, not surprisingly, the state of Israel, which has not only been a target of 
terrorist attacks since its foundation, but is also the only functional democracy in its neighborhood. 
As a consequence, the citizens of the Jewish state had an opportunity to thresh out some of the 
dilemmas that such attacks pose for a democratic polity. In 1987, following two well-publicized 
cases of alleged torture—including that of an Israeli army lieutenant accused of treason and 
espionage—a commission headed by retired Israeli Supreme Court Justice Moshe Landau articulated 
a series of guidelines for the use of “moderate physical pressure” and “non-violent psychological 
pressure” in the interrogation of prisoners withholding information about impending acts of 
terrorism, when the knowledge obtained could save lives (see Gross 2002: 1173-1174). The 
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techniques employed by Israel’s General Security Service (GSS), also known as Shin Bet, included 
shaking the prisoners, depriving them of sleep, and placing them in various positions including the 
“Shabach” (where the prisoner is seated on a low stool or chair, tilted forward, with his or her hands 
tied behind the back and head covered by a sack, while loud music is played), the “Kasa’at at-
tawlah” (where the prisoner is painfully stretched, using a table and direct pressure), and the 
“Qumbaz” or “frog crouch” (where the prisoner is forced to crouch on tiptoe with his or her hands 
tied behind his back). There is considerable evidence—albeit much contested by opponents of the 
techniques used—that these methods have saved a number of lives by preventing terrorist attacks. 
In 1999, however, writing for the Israeli Supreme Court in Public Committee Against Torture v. 
Government of Israel, the tribunal’s president, Aharon Barak, prohibited the use of physical pressure 
since it was never authorized by the Knesset. Barak’s judgment came even as he acknowledged: 
The facts presented before this Court reveal that one hundred and twenty people died in terrorist attacks 
between 1.1.96 and 14.5.98. Seven hundred and seven people were injured. A large number of those killed 
and injured were victims of harrowing suicide bombings in the heart of Israel’s cities. Many attacks—
including suicide bombings, attempts to detonate car bombs, kidnappings of citizens and soldiers, attempts to 
hijack buses, murders, the placing of explosives, etc.—were prevented due to the measures taken by the 
authorities responsible for fighting the above described hostile terrorist activities on a daily basis. (Supreme 
Court of Israel 1999: 1473) 
Nonetheless, the court held that the GSS interrogations violated Basic Law because human 
dignity and liberty clauses guaranteeing freedom from violation of an individual’s body or dignity 
were rights that could be infringed upon only “by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, 
enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required.” Consequently, the 
tribunal granted an absolute order nisi declaring that the security agency “does not have the authority 
to ‘shake’ a man, hold him in the ‘Shabach’ position…force him into a ‘frog crouch’ position and 
deprive him of sleep in a manner other than that which is inherently required by interrogation” 
(Supreme Court of Israel 1999: 1489). If the aggressive interrogation techniques of its security 
services fail to pass this juridical muster, one is left wondering about the Israeli Supreme Court’s 
opinion concerning the “targeted killing,” usually by conventional military means carried out by the 
Israeli Defense Forces, of individuals who pose a terrorist threat or have been determined to have 
been culpable of a previous attack. Johns Hopkins University Professor Steven David described the 
elaborate decision making process, whose specific procedures have never been officially published:  
Typically, Israeli intelligence agencies, often relying on the testimony of collaborators, will identify individuals 
who pose a terrorist threat. The agencies prepare a report detailing the past activities of the suspect and assess 
the potential for him or her to engage in future attacks. This information is evaluated by a group in the Israeli 
Defense Forces that includes the commander of the region and military lawyers. A recommendation is then 
made to the chief of staff. If the recommendation is to target the individual, the Israeli cabinet is brought in to 
approve or disapprove of the action. Once approval is given, the IDF usually does not seek additional 
approval to make the strike. However, if innocent casualties could occur as a result of the operation, the IDF 
will again seek the approval of the minister of defense and the prime minister before launching the attack. 
(David 2003: 117). 
This policy, of course, is ethically—and legally—defensible only if it is carried out strictly against 
combatants in the juridical sense previously outlined. The Western just war tradition is based on the 
requirement that, in order to be moral, the use of force in armed conflict needs to be discriminate 
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and proportionate. In the case of targeted killing, the action against the unlawful combatants must 
be discriminate insofar as it upholds the immunity of noncombatants and minimizes collateral 
damage, and proportionate in that no more force is used than necessary to carry out the mission. 
Even where the policy has been applied to those carrying out—or at least assisting in—terrorist 
attacks against civilians, it still raises disturbing moral and political issues since it effectively involves 
a state decision to deprive someone of life without the benefit of judicial proceedings. As the 
example of the death penalty in the United States has eloquently shown, even the judicial process is 
no guarantee that a mistake will not be made (see Stein 2003: 134). Where mistakes have come to 
light, they have usually been uncovered as a result of an adversarial process—a zealous defense 
attorney or perhaps a critical judge—rather than through a change of heart on the part of the 
prosecutor. Even this minimal procedural safeguard of judicial review, however, is not afforded to 
the would-be objects of targeted killing mandates.  
Nonetheless, in at least one instance that has been officially acknowledged, the U.S. government 
has apparently emulated the Israeli practice of targeted killing: in November 2002, the U.S. used an 
unmanned Predator aircraft to launch a missile that killed a senior al-Qaeda operative as well as five 
companions as they were traveling by car in a remote part of Yemen. However, critics of the policy 
note that, at least in Israel, there has yet to be a judicial determination of its legality (see Stein 2003: 
133-132), much less evidence of its effectiveness in diminishing terrorist attacks. In any event, given
the current political climate, and the not inconsiderable international scrutiny to which the state is
subject, it is extremely unlikely that any legislation authorizing Shin Bet’s erstwhile interrogation
techniques could be passed, much less the policy of targeted killing given formal codification in law.
Understandably, the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal has occasioned its share of righteous 
indignation, rendering anything remotely similar to Dershowitz’s proposed “torture warrants” or 
formalization of Israel’s interrogation and targeted killing tactics verboten for the foreseeable future, 
especially for the United States. Figures as disparate as liberal philanthropist George Soros and the 
Vatican’s secretary for relations with states Giovanni Lajolo have even compared it with the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. While perhaps satisfying, such talk falls into the trap of moral 
equivalency. On the opposite side, others, while embarrassed by the abuse, talk about a “new kind of 
war” requiring different methods, without providing the least bit of guidance as what those 
assertions really mean—the Dershowitz proposal a notable exception that proves the rule. Caught 
between these two contending sides is what one suspects to be the position of the overwhelming 
majority of Americans and, indeed, perhaps of ordinary men and women throughout the world. 
While these centrists recognize that the only way to defeat terrorist militants is to use force, by and 
large they prefer not to think about the consequences implied by that affirmation. As a result, both 
leaders and citizens essentially abdicate moral responsibility, a burden that Ignatieff seeks to restore 
with his option for a willfully chosen “lesser evil” approach to combating terrorism.  
Back to Reality 
According to Ignatieff, the greatest challenge that terrorists present to a free society, its ultimate 
“logic,” is la politique du pire: 
They believe that by provoking the United States and its Arab allies into indiscriminate acts of oppression, 
they will turn them, as it were, into recruiting sergeants for their cause. They have understood that the impact 
of terrorism is dialectical. Success depends less on the initial attack than on instigating an escalatory spiral, 
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controlled not by the forces of order but by the terrorists themselves. If terrorists can successfully draw 
democracies into this spiral and control its upward acceleration, they will begin to dictate the terms of the 
encounter. Success becomes a matter of inflicting losses, enduring harms, and gambling that the enemy has less 
endurance than they do. Since a state will always be too strong for a cell of individuals to defeat in open battle, 
it must defeat itself. If terrorists can provoke the state into atrocity, this will begin to erode the willingness of a 
democratic public to continue the fight. Democracies may have the stomach for the occasional atrocity, but over 
the long term a policy of atrocity is unsustainable (61-62). 
It is not by mere coincidence that it is the French who coined the expression la politique du pire—
literally, “the politics of the worst.” In addition to a rich language, the French had the experience of 
Algeria where, in the 1950s, terrorists fighting the French colonial government provoked it into a 
downward spiral of repression and atrocities so severe that the Algerian populace eventually joined 
the insurgents while the citizens of metropolitan France abandoned the North African territory in 
disgust. American policy analysts would do well to recall this history when they confront images of 
contractors dragged from cars and set afire and dismembered, and ask themselves if they are really 
prepared to play the game to the finish. 
In the current debate, what is needed is a recovery of the realistic Hobbesian viewpoint: one 
ought not construct abstract ethical systems that are out of line with the human moral and political 
capacities and the circumstances of war. For Hobbes, a primary condition of any ethic is that 
individuals and groups be able consistently to follow it. Otherwise, such laws threaten obsolescence 
because they have little or no relationship to social realities, and are thus unreasonable (see Kavka 
1986: 29-83). This realist vision does not so much hold that individuals and states should ignore the 
demands of morality when placed in extreme situations. Rather they redefine those demands so that 
individuals and groups, including states, have an affirmative right to take extreme measures in self-
defense of the basic foundation for human existence: physical security itself. As Robert Jackson 
affirms, “the laws and ethics of war are only realistic to the extent that they are within the moral 
reach of average people in their concrete circumstances” (Jackson 2000: 218). Standards of conduct 
tailored to saints have no place in war and peace—or any other human endeavor for that matter. 
On the other hand, neither should standards be set too low, lest one is swept into the whirlpool 
of la politique du pire. There is a slippery slope descending from civilization—governed by laws and 
valuing human dignity—to barbarism—governed by passions and valuing nothing. Consequently, as 
Ignatieff argues convincingly, it is the procedural requirements and prudential maxims of a 
democratic polity that point the way to a possible resolution, one that is desperately needed if free 
societies are to continue confronting “an enemy whose demands cannot be appeased, who cannot 
be deterred, and who does not have to win in order for us to lose” (153). After all, as Walter 
Laqueur concluded somberly at the end of his study on the future of terrorism, there is little 
likelihood that the threat will diminish in the foreseeable future: 
Even in the unlikely case that all global conflicts will be resolved—that all political, social, and economic 
tensions of this world will vanish—this will not necessarily be the end of terrorism. The combination of 
paranoia, fanaticism, and extremist political (or religious) doctrine will find new outlets. It is the reservoir 
from which the terrorism of today and tomorrow attracts its followers. Perhaps it is not part of the human 
condition, but it certainly is part of the condition of certain sections and individuals. There are bound to be 
ups and downs as far as the frequency and the political impact of terrorism is concerned. But there is a huge 
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reservoir of aggression, and for this reason terrorism will be with us as far as one can look ahead (Laqueur 
2003: 231). 
But if the fate of free societies is to be perpetually tested in the forge of unrelenting, 
asymmetrical, non-reciprocal warfare, then Ignatieff’s counsels are indeed prudent, even if his 
specific policy prescriptions are contestable. A “lesser evil” approach to ethics permits the necessary 
flexibility that the circumstances of the war on terror require—including, perhaps including among 
other difficult choices, prolonged preventative detention, aggressive interrogation, preemptive 
strikes and targeted killings—while the vigorous scrutiny of the adversarial process in democratic 
polities can keep flexibility from becoming license. As the Israeli Supreme Court acknowledged in 
summarizing its ruling outlawing Shin Bet’s interrogation techniques: 
This decision opens with a description of the difficult reality in which Israel finds herself security wise. We 
shall conclude this judgment by readdressing that harsh reality. We are aware that this decision does not ease 
dealing with that reality. This is the destiny of democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it, and not all 
practices employed by its enemies are open before it. Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied 
behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving the Rule of Law and recognition of an 
individual’s liberty constitutes an important component in its understanding of security. At the end of the day, 
they strengthen its spirit and its strength and allow it to overcome its difficulties. (Supreme Court of Israel 
1999: 1489). 
However, if it is to successfully steer the realistic middle course between an absolutist human 
rights/civil liberties position that does not accept that rights violations can ever be justified, and an 
equally purist consequentialist position that judges actions solely on their effectiveness, this process 
must be driven by truth rather than lies, openness rather than denial. Policy mechanisms must be 
artfully constructed with procedural safeguards including, for example, independent review of 
detentions, clearly delineated parameters for interrogation, and well-understood strategic goals and 
accountability for preemptive actions. In his dissent to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Hamdi decision 
(one in which he was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens), Justice Antonin Scalia professed that it 
was beyond his competence to know which “tools are sufficient to meet the government’s security 
needs, including the need to obtain intelligence through interrogation.” He nonetheless asserted, 
“[i]f civil liberties are to be curtailed during war time, it must be done openly and democratically, as 
the Constitution requires, rather than by silent erosion.” Of course, the democratic process, no 
matter how open or inclusive, offers no guarantees concerning the virtue or even justice of its public 
policy choices: after all, choices, even erroneous ones, as well as their attendant consequences are 
unavoidable elements of the human experience. However, while the adversarial dynamics of 
democratic proceedings are fallible, they do allow for the possibility of correcting errors. 
Consequently, in democratic societies, it is always preferable to decide controversial issues after open 
debate and due deliberation, rather than to make them hastily when impassioned and under duress. 
This is especially true where the choice that has to be made is tragic: balancing liberty with security.     
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